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Taxing the Informal Economy: Challenges, Possibilities and Remaining 
Questions* 
 
Anuradha Joshi, Wilson Prichard and Christopher Heady 
 
 
Summary  
 
Recent years have witnessed significantly increased attention to the challenge of taxing 
small businesses in the informal sector. However, much of this recent attention has remained 
focused on comparatively technical issues of revenue maximisation and policy design. This 
paper argues that this debate should focus increasingly on the wider development 
implications of informal sector taxation, as well as the political and institutional barriers to 
improved performance.   
 
When considering the merits of committing scarce resources to taxing small informal sector 
firms, debate has frequently focused on limited revenue potential, high costs of collection and 
potentially perverse impacts on small firms. By contrast, recent arguments have increasingly 
emphasised more indirect benefits of informal taxation in relation to economic growth, tax 
compliance and governance. These potentially broader benefits are increasingly finding 
support in recent research, but they are contingent on government support and consequently 
demand further attention.  
 
When we turn our attention away from whether tax authorities should tax small informal 
businesses towards the challenge of how to do so more effectively, we again argue that a 
broader frame of analysis is needed. Most existing research has focused on developing less 
distortionary tax regimes and on tax simplification in order to reduce the costs of compliance. 
However, while important, there strategies remain too narrow. Encouraging tax compliance 
demands not only lowering costs but also strengthening the potential benefits of 
formalisation, from increased security to new economic opportunities. As importantly, 
successful reform needs political support from political leaders, tax administrators and 
taxpayers alike. This demands greater attention to strengthening political incentives for 
reform, through strategic policy, administrative and institutional reform. With this in mind, the 
paper highlights a number of recent experiences that have sought to address these 
challenges, but which need further study.  
 
Keywords: taxation; informal sector; developing countries; politics; hard-to-tax. 
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Introduction 
 
The question of taxing the informal economy1 in developing and transition countries has 
received increasing attention in recent years.2 This reflects a growing recognition of the 
potential benefits of informal sector taxation in terms of revenue, growth and governance. 
With respect to revenue, the informal sector forms a large, and, in many countries, growing 
share of GDP, and thus represents a potentially significant source of tax revenue (Schneider 
and Klinglmair 2004, Schneider et al. 2010). Taxing the informal sector may also be essential 
to sustain tax morale and tax compliance among larger firms (Torgler 2003, Terkper 2003, 
Alm et al. 2003). With respect to growth, the formalisation of informal sector firms may 
accelerate growth and may have broader benefits for existing formal sector firms (Loeprick 
2009, Perry et al 2007, Fajnzylber et al 2009a, 2009b, McCulloch et al. 2010, de Mel et al. 
2012). Finally, with respect to governance, the payment of taxes by firms in the informal 
economy may be a way of engaging firms with the state, and thus promoting good 
governance and political accountability (Joshi and Ayee 2008, Prichard 2009).  
 
However, while the topic has received more attention, this has not been without controversy 
or challenges. Controversy has surrounded the question of whether taxing the informal 
sector should, in fact, be a major priority for developing country governments. In the view of 
critics, the potential revenue yields are low, administrative costs are high, tax incidence is 
likely to be regressive, and the broader growth and governance gains remain insufficiently 
proven (Keen 2012: 19-21, 30-32). This disagreement aside, major questions remain about 
how, in practice, to achieve meaningful improvements in informal sector taxation, as 
progress in implementation has been slow. Policymakers have shown comparatively little 
interest in this area, owing to the relatively small amount of revenue that can be raised 
compared to large businesses, and the potentially high political cost of trying to expand 
informal sector taxation. Meanwhile, tax administrators face major operational difficulties – 
including the lack of bookkeeping, transience of operations and the large number of 
unregistered businesses. They may also have few incentives to prioritise informal sector 
taxation.  
 
This paper seeks to take stock of the existing debate, to draw attention to new thinking about 
how to strengthen informal sector taxation, and to highlight recent innovations and efforts. 
While there are many definitions of the informal sector, this review focuses on small and 
medium sized informal enterprises, rather than workers in the informal sector. The central 
goal is to move beyond the majority of the recent literature, which addresses the problem of 
taxing the informal sector largely in terms of the technical demands of policy design, in order 
to frame the issue equally as a problem of incentives, politics and institutions. That is, what 
incentives can be created to improve compliance among currently informal sector firms, how 
can the political barriers to greater informal sector taxation be overcome, and what 
institutional arrangements might contribute to this goal? This framing allows us to think about 
reform generally, and recent innovations specifically, in terms of their ability to address these 
challenges. 
                                               
1  In this paper we use the terms ‘informal sector’ and ‘informal economy’ interchangeably.  Some have argued for 
dropping the term sector in favour of economy (Chen et al. 2002).  We follow the trend in the literature reviewed here, 
which tends to use both terms. 
2  Recent conferences looking at the theme of informal sector taxation in Africa and Asia that were organised by the 
International Tax Dialogue (ITD) reflect this concern. These were held in Rwanda (www.itdweb.org/rwandaconference/ 
documents/program.pdf), Georgia (www.itdweb.org/GeorgiaConference/documents/Program.pdf), and the Philippines 
(www.itdweb.org/ManilaConference/documents/program.pdf). Simultaneously, scholars working on the business 
environment, private sector development and economic growth are also increasingly aware of issues related to the 
informal economy (including taxation) as evident from the recent Donor Committee for Enterprise Development’s 
conference on ‘Business Environment Reform and the Informal Economy’ in Cape Town, South Africa, April 2010 
(www.enterprise-development.org/page/informal-economy-conference-2010).  Most importantly, a growing number of 
tax authorities are looking seriously at ways of tackling this issue, and a number of experiments have been carried out in 
several countries, particularly in Africa, many of which are explored in this paper.   
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section one explores competing definitions 
of the informal economy, highlighting our focus on micro and small enterprises large enough 
to pay taxes, but small enough to warrant unique policy and administrative arrangements. 
Section two turns to the question of whether informal sector taxation should, in fact, be given 
some priority in low-income countries, and suggests that there are persuasive arguments for 
doing so. Section three presents a review of the major policy options for taxing informal 
sector firms, highlighting our focus on specialised presumptive tax regimes that target small 
enterprises. Section four considers the broad barriers to more effective taxation of the 
informal sector, and possible approaches to identifying solutions. It highlights both the need 
to create individual and collective incentives for small firms to more readily accept taxation, 
and the challenge of generating commitment to more effective taxation among political elites 
and tax administrators. Section five draws on this analysis in exploring a series of recent 
administrative innovations aimed at strengthening informal sector taxation. While many are 
very recent, we consider their impact so far, as well as the extent to which they address the 
major barriers to success identified earlier. The final section highlights a series of key 
questions that need to be addressed in future thinking about research and policy. 
1 Defining the informal sector 
 
The term informal sector is much debated and contested. As Peattie (1987) noted several 
decades ago, the concept is a fuzzy one, popular because it encompasses the interests of a 
wide variety of interest groups. The term, originally proposed by Keith Hart (1973), was 
initially used to refer to employment outside of formal labour markets. The idea was to 
distinguish businesses on their ‘degree of rationalisation, or embodiment of impersonal 
principles of social organisation’ (Hart 2005). In the seventies, the International Labour 
Organisation took up the concept, and mainly used it for small and microenterprises that 
were outside the purview of government regulation and taxation (ILO 1972). These were 
mainly viewed as businesses in the subsistence economy. The term was reinterpreted in 
1989, when De Soto identified the informal sector as a source of dynamism and growth, held 
back only by inappropriate government regulation. The conception of the informal sector thus 
moved to a focus on the legal status of the business: whether or not it was registered and 
followed appropriate legislation. It is this legal definition that has widespread use today 
(Gerxhani 2004, Kenyon 2007). Firms in the informal sector are there because they 
contravene – or are not subject to – some of a variety of rules and regulations including 
labour laws, environmental laws, registration and taxation.3    
 
This brief history of the origins of the concept highlights several issues that are pertinent to 
our concern with taxation. First, although the term initially described labour conditions, its 
current use encompasses informal wage labour, the self-employed, and informal sector 
firms. Second, the term informal sector is often used to describe a duality: an opposition to 
the formal sector. In this conception firms can be classified into one category or the other. In 
practice, however, the duality description is misleading. As evident from the most cursory 
survey of businesses in the developing world, there is a continuum of firm types from the 
most informal (subsistence type activities) to the most formal (formal, tax-paying law-abiding 
businesses). It is clear that, depending upon the context, businesses often move along this 
continuum, some seeking formalisation, others falling into informality as the cost-benefit 
calculations of being in one category or another change. Focusing solely on the question of 
tax compliance, while informal sector operators may escape national taxation, they are often 
burdened by several types of fees, charges and licensing costs paid to local governments 
                                               
3  Some have argued that the size of the informal sector is related to deliberate government policies and regulations that 
create barriers to entry and related rents that can be easily appropriated through taxation at low administrative costs 
(Auriol and Warlters 2005). Others suggest that regulation is related to the size of the informal economy only in 
countries with effective law enforcement (Kus 2010). 
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(de Mel et al. 2010). More broadly, the literature on private sector development has long 
highlighted that the formal and informal economies are inexorably linked.4 Formal businesses 
often use inputs produced by the informal economy and are frequently involved in complex 
subcontracting arrangements with them – for example, advancing credit in the form of 
material (Mitchell 1993). At the same time, many street vendors and small traders operate on 
behalf of larger and medium size businesses, with, for example, retailers in Africa often 
engaging informal sector operators to sell their goods on the street. 
 
Following much of the existing literature, we make several boundary choices for this 
research. First, we do not focus on workers in the informal economy but on businesses and 
their owners (including the self employed), because they are more likely to have an income 
that is sufficiently high to have a tax liability. The more important distinction is between three 
groups: subsistence enterprises which would normally not be liable for taxes; informal small 
and microenterprises who could be the subject of specific informal sector targeting regimes; 
and small and medium firms, who are clearly large enough to be in the standard tax net but 
are not.5 These three groups are described in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1: A typology of enterprise informality 
 
Features 
 
Informal Economy 
 
 
 
Formal Economy 
 A 
Subsistence Enterprises 
B 
Microenterprises and 
Small Businesses  
C 
Small and Medium 
Businesses 
D 
Small, Medium and 
Large Businesses 
Degree of 
informality 
Totally informal for the 
most part 
High proportion of sales 
undeclared and workers not 
registered 
Some proportion of sales 
undeclared and workers 
unregistered  
Labour and firms 
registered and regulated 
Type of activity Street traders, 
cottage/microenterprises, 
subsistence farmers 
Small manufacturers, 
service providers, 
distributors, contractors 
Small and medium 
manufacturers, service 
providers 
Range of manufacturing 
and services 
Technology Labour intensive Mostly labour intensive Mixed labour and capital 
intensive 
Knowledge and capital 
intensive 
Owner profile Poor, low education, low 
level of skills 
Poor and non-poor, well 
educated, high level of skills 
Non-poor, likely educated, 
skilled 
Non-poor, highly 
educated, sophisticated 
level of skills 
Markets Low barriers to entry, 
highly competitive, high 
product homogeneity 
Low barriers to entry, highly 
competitive, some product 
differentiation 
Some barriers to entry, 
established markets 
Significant barriers to 
entry, established market/ 
product niche 
Finance needs Working capital Working capital, some 
investment capital, supplier 
credit 
Investment capital and 
working capital, letters of 
credit, supplier credit 
Investment capital and 
working capital, letters of 
credit, supplier credit 
Other needs Personal insurance, social 
protection, security 
Personal and perhaps 
business insurance and 
business support services, 
security 
Personal and business 
insurance, business 
development services 
Personal and business 
insurance, business 
development services 
Tax implications Earnings can be below 
minimum tax threshold 
No recordkeeping, cash 
transactions 
Liable for tax, difficult to 
identify and assess, poor or 
no recordkeeping, cash 
transactions 
Liable for tax, under-report 
earnings, use loopholes, 
escape formal tax 
assessments  
Taxed under formal tax 
assessment 
Tax design 
desired features 
No tax liabilities Low rates to encourage 
registration, minimal 
compliance costs, low 
administration costs 
High rates to encourage 
graduation into formal 
regime 
 
Source: Adapted from Zinnes’ (2009:8) adaptation of Djankov et. al. (2002). 
                                               
4  In understanding the links between the formal and informal economies, the literature can be divided into three main 
views: the dualist, the legalist and the structuralist (Chen et al. 2002).  In the dualist view, the informal economy is 
marginal and subsistence oriented, provides a safety net for the poor and is not directly linked to the formal economy 
(ILO 1972). The legalist view sees microentrepreneurs opting out of the over-regulation of business by government by 
going informal (De Soto 1989).  Finally, the structuralist view focuses on the informal economy as a product of privileged 
capitalists attempting to reduce the costs of production by hiring informal labour and subordinating small and 
microbusinesses (Portes and Castells 1989). 4  These views underpin the quite different conceptions of what policy 
approaches to take vis-a-vis formalisation. 
5  Standard tax policy literature distinguishes between Large Taxpayers, Medium Taxpayers and Small Taxpayers.  Some 
make a distinction between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and microenterprises, which include 
subsistence businesses (Bodin and Koukpaizan 2008). 
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This paper is concerned with small and micro businesses that generate enough income to 
warrant taxation, but find it easy to escape the attention of the tax administration or to 
conceal a substantial part of their liability for tax because of their location, size and/or nature 
of their business.6 These fall within columns B and C of Table 1. While our focus is on 
bringing these firms into the tax net, this is invariably linked to the broader question of 
formalisation. Table 1 makes it clear that registering with the tax authorities is only one of 
many features associated with informality. It is important to bear in mind both the narrow 
question of taxation and the broader implications of formalisation, in order to understand both 
the motivation of such firms and the merits of taxing them.  
2 Should taxing the informal sector be a 
priority?  
 
As noted in the introduction, increasing attention to the taxation of the informal economy is 
grounded in its potential importance to revenue, growth and governance. However, it is 
important to interrogate the basis for this enthusiasm carefully. Most notably, the direct 
revenue benefits of taxing the informal sector are likely to be relatively modest, and the 
implications for vertical equity potentially adverse. As such, much of the argument for 
taxation of the informal sector is grounded in potentially more indirect revenue benefits, the 
prospects of accelerated growth and the potential for governance gains. These effects are 
less well established empirically. On balance, they nonetheless present a convincing 
argument for increased efforts to expand taxation of the informal economy, though there is a 
need for sensitivity to potential costs and greater research into predicted benefits.  
2.1 Revenue and equity implications 
 
Much of the debate over the costs and benefits of taxing the informal sector has focused on 
the direct revenue and equity implications of the taxes themselves. On the surface, taxation 
of the informal economy appears to be a potentially important source of government 
revenue, as the informal sector comprises a large, and in many countries growing, share of 
GDP (Schneider and Klinglmair 2004, Schneider et al. 2010).7 However, in practice the 
revenue gains from expanded taxation of the informal economy are likely to be comparatively 
modest over the short to medium term. Apart from the difficulty of bringing such firms into the 
tax net, individual incomes within the sector are low, and tax rates correspondingly modest, 
while the costs of collection and overall administrative burden are very high, owing to the 
large number of individual firms and the difficulty of monitoring. Further opposition to the 
taxation of the informal economy is sometimes raised on equity grounds, as the operators of 
informal sector firms are frequently low-income, thus making taxation of such firms potentially 
regressive (e.g. Pimhidzai and Fox 2012). If efforts to tax the informal sector also increase 
the risk of relatively coercive or corrupt behaviour by tax officials, these concerns are 
exacerbated. Consequently, many tax experts have been somewhat sceptical of the value of 
focusing significant scarce resources in developing countries on taxing small informal sector 
firms, given low revenue yields, high administrative costs and the questionable value of 
taxing low-income individuals (Keen 2012: 19-21, 30-32). 
                                               
6  Owing to the potential ambiguity of the term informal sector, some authors have preferred the term hard-to-tax. 
However, this term has the disadvantage of being broader than our focus here, as is tends to include agricultural 
production minimally, while other hard-to-tax groups, like the high-income self-employed, may also be included (Alm et 
al. 2004, Bird and Wallace 2003) 
7  Schneider et al. (2010) examined the shadow economy (which is a broader category than just the informal sector) and 
find that the shadow economy on average modestly shrank between 1999 and 2007, but is still quite large (38.4% of 
official GDP) in Africa.   
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Viewed through a purely revenue and equity lens, justification for expanding informal sector 
taxation rests instead to a significant degree on more indirect connections. One possibility is 
that the taxation of small informal sector firms, while yielding little revenue in the short-term, 
serves to bring these firms into the tax net, thus ensuring higher tax compliance if they 
expand over time. More simply, it is a matter of building a culture of tax compliance among 
SMEs.8 A related argument turns the standard equity argument on its head, suggesting that 
the failure of informal firms to pay taxes can be viewed as a source of unfairness by formal 
firms. This may lower general tax morale and discourage tax compliance among larger firms, 
leading to reduced government revenue (Torgler 2003, Terkper 2003, Alm et al. 2003). The 
latter argument finds some support in evidence that tax morale is lower in countries with a 
larger informal sector (Torgler and Schneider 2007), but overall these connections remain 
only weakly documented empirically. 
2.2 Implications for growth 
 
At least as important as the immediate revenue implications of informal sector taxation, are 
the implications of expanded taxation for the growth of small firms. This is central to 
supporting job creation and poverty reduction among lower-income groups, long-term 
economic development and the development of a larger tax base over time. The immediate 
concern for many tax experts is that increased taxation of small firms may ultimately hinder 
growth, and that this cost may far outweigh the revenue benefit. This logic is intuitively 
compelling, and rests on the notion that small firms opt into informality precisely because 
they believe that informality will benefit them, given the burdens of formality. However, 
despite this fear that taxation may hinder growth, a growing body of research suggests that 
formalisation – of which entry into the tax net is a central component – may, in fact, have 
significant benefits for growth, or, at the very least, may not hinder growth. At the core of 
those findings is the fact that informality carries a variety of costs to firms, and it also 
precludes access to certain opportunities available to formal firms. The benefits of formality 
may include greater access to credit, increased opportunities to engage with large firms and 
the government, reduced harassment by police and municipal officials, and access to 
broader training and support programmes. Of course, the fact that many firms continue to opt 
into informality, despite these apparent benefits, suggests that there remain important 
barriers to formality, that the potential benefits to bringing firms into the tax net is likely to be 
dependent on the particular features of how this goal is achieved, and that any costs and 
benefits are likely to vary across firms.  
 
Much of the early evidence that formalisation may lead to more rapid growth comes from 
evidence that formal firms tend to grow faster than informal sector firms. However, such 
studies leave open the question of causality: do firms grow faster because they are formal, or 
do firms with greater growth prospects formalise? More recently, a handful of studies have 
begun to provide more robust evidence. In a paper examining the impacts of formalisation 
based on panel data on microfirms in Mexico, Fajnzylber et al (2009a) find that formalisation 
in the form of access to credit, training, tax payments and participation in business 
associations has positive effects on firm profits, growth and survival. Formalisation appears 
to have the effect of bringing microfirms closer to their optimal size. In a controlled study in 
Sri Lanka, de Mel et al. (2012) find evidence that formalisation had significant benefits for a 
small group of firms, while for most firms incomes were relatively unaffected, though firm 
owners felt that they came to enjoy greater legitimacy. 
 
In a study of Indonesian microenterprises, McCulloch et al. (2010) find that microenterprises 
employing a greater number of workers (highest employment quartile) increase their profits 
the most from formalisation. McKenzie and Sakho (2010) examine microfirms in Bolivia using 
                                               
8  Interview by Joshi with senior officer responsible for domestic taxes in Tanzania, November 2011. 
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distance from the tax office as an instrumental proxy for informality, in an effort to establish 
the causal role of formalisation. They find that formalisation, in the form of registration with 
the tax authorities, increases firm profitability – but only for mid-sized firms. Others using 
slightly different methods and approaches come to similar conclusions with slightly different 
emphases and nuances (Fajnzylber et al 2009b). While these studies point towards the 
existence of growth benefits from formalisation, they do suggest that the benefits may be 
reduced for the smallest microbusinesses. A survey of informal microfirms in Mexico 
conducted by McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) provides a possible explanation, as they find 
that many microbusinesses explain that the benefits of formalisation, though real, are not 
high enough, or exclusive enough, for them to be an incentive to formalise. Given that 
microbusiness may be able, for example, to rely on informal credit mechanisms, the added 
value of formalisation may be comparatively limited. 
 
Another reason why the benefits of formalisation may be smaller for microbusinesses is that 
these businesses may have different interests than larger firms. There is a stream of 
literature that argues that many microbusinesses are operated by individuals who are not 
entrepreneurs, but who are doing something while waiting for an opportunity to enter salaried 
jobs, or who are running microbusinesses in parallel with other employment in order to 
supplement income (Maloney 2004). In such circumstances, expanding the business may 
not be a central motivation, and formalisation is more likely to be irrelevant and potentially 
costly. More broadly, there may be differences between firms who choose to enter the tax 
net in order to access new opportunities and those that are simply ‘caught’ by the tax 
authorities. The only study to explicitly adopt this distinction is Fajnzylber et al. (2009a: 
1042), and they find that paying taxes constituted a benefit for all firms, leading to at least a 
20 per cent increase in profits, whether they were unfortunately caught or willingly compliant. 
2.3 Governance implications 
 
An important additional factor motivating recent interest in taxing the informal economy is the 
possibility that the payment of taxes by firms in the informal economy may be a way of 
promoting good governance and political accountability of the state. This argument builds on 
a broader body of research suggesting that tax payment may contribute to broader 
governance gains through three related channels. First, in order to encourage quasi-
voluntary tax compliance, the state may be more responsive and accountable to groups that 
pay taxes (Bates and Lien 1985, Levi 1988). Second, individuals may be more likely to make 
demands for responsiveness and accountability if they are paying taxes, as it may foster a 
sense of ownership over government activities (Bird and Vaillancourt 1998: 10-11, Prichard 
2009, 2010b). Third, efforts to tax informal sector operators may encourage collective action 
and collective political engagement by informal sector associations, providing a longer term 
foundation for expanded bargaining (Joshi and Ayee 2008, Prichard 2009). 
 
These potential connections suggest that the expanded taxation of the informal economy, if 
pursued in a comparatively contractual manner (Moore 2008), could become an important 
basis for expanding political voice among relatively marginalised groups. However, evidence 
for these propositions remains very preliminary. Joshi and Ayee (2008) show that 
government efforts in Ghana to tax informal sector firms resulted in at least some degree of 
bargaining between informal sector associations and the government (see also Prichard 
2009). In a similar vein, Prichard (2010b) finds that expanded taxation of small firms in 
Ethiopia prior to elections in 2005 triggered some public mobilisation and prompted the 
government to include greater business involvement in overseeing the presumptive tax 
regime. Finally, de Mel et al. (2012) find that in Sri Lanka the formalisation of firms, including 
entrance into the tax net, fostered expanded trust in the state, though they do not explore 
any broader governance implications. As such, these issues remain a potentially powerful 
argument for taxing informal sector operators, though much more research is needed. 
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3 Policy options for taxing the informal sector 
 
The various costs and benefits of taxing the informal sector lead to disagreement about how 
much priority it should be given. There is, however, broad agreement on the value of 
improving existing practices, which are frequently both ineffective and prone to abuse. The 
bulk of existing research on this topic has focused on the technical design of appropriate 
policies for taxing the informal economy, with a smaller literature addressing the question of 
strengthening administration. We correspondingly consider alternative policy strategies here, 
while we return to the less studied question of administration in the following section. We 
focus exclusively on taxes, but it is worth again bearing in mind that informal sector firms also 
frequently pay a variety of fees, charges and licensing costs, particularly to local 
governments. We propose that policy strategies can be thought of in three broad, and not 
mutually exclusive, categories: taxing indirectly through trade taxes, expanding the reach of 
major formal sector taxes, and developing specialised presumptive tax regimes. We review 
each in turn, while it is specialised presumptive taxes that are our primary focus.  
3.1 Taxing the informal sector indirectly 
 
The simplest way to tax the informal sector is indirectly, by taxing the goods and services 
that it buys and sells, most obviously through VAT and import and export duties. Here 
indirect implies that informal sector firms are not themselves registered as taxpayers, but are 
nonetheless taxed by virtue of taxes paid on goods and services higher up the value chain. 
In this sense many informal sector firms effectively do pay some taxes, though less than 
would be the case if they were registered. More important than the revenue foregone, as this 
strategy does not require active informal sector participation in the tax system, it is likely to 
have a limited impact on long-term compliance, does not carry the potential growth benefits 
of formalisation, and is unlikely to spur governance gains. 
 
In practice, this is a predominant form of taxation of informal sector firms. While export taxes 
were once a common form of taxation of agricultural production of cash crops (e.g. cocoa, 
coffee and tea) in developing countries, the role of such taxes has significantly diminished 
over the past few decades. In contrast, import taxes have remained a major component of 
developing country tax revenue, and are still significant despite sharp reductions in rates 
since the 1980s. Gordon and Li (2009) report that the poorest countries on average still raise 
more than 16 per cent of government revenue from border taxes, a number that declines to 
5.4 per cent for the richer developing countries and 0.7 per cent for developed countries. 
They also develop a model that explicitly explains this pattern as a strategy for dealing with 
tax evasion by potential taxpayers that are outside of the banking system and difficult to tax. 
 
The traditional economic argument against import and export taxes is that they prevent 
countries from fully exploiting their comparative advantage, and may thus discourage growth 
more than domestic taxes. This argument is weakened by the difficulties in taxing the 
informal sector: Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1974) showed that limitations in the imposition of 
domestic taxes could justify trade taxes (tariffs), and Heady and Mitra (1987) showed how an 
untaxable agricultural sector could justify taxation of imported fertilizer. More recently, Emran 
and Stiglitz (2005) have argued that a non-taxable informal sector makes tariffs desirable. In 
addition, it is a form of taxation that does not require any active informal sector participation 
in the tax system (such as filing tax returns), and so does not come up against the difficulties 
of high compliance costs or limited education and capacity in some parts of the informal 
sector.  
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3.2 Reliance on existing taxes on formal sector firms 
 
The most obvious alternative to relying on taxing firms indirectly is to extend the reach of 
common formal sector taxes, including income taxes and VAT, to reach small informal firms. 
This is a question of strengthening enforcement by identifying small informal sector firms and 
ensuring compliance (e.g. Terkper 2003, Bird and Casanegra 1992, Bird and Wallace 2003: 
7-8). It may be buttressed by the use of additional incentives for compliance, such as 
reduced rates or rewards to small firms that maintain effective records, though both types of 
measures can increase the overall complexity of the tax system and create incentives for 
small firms to remain, or appear to remain, small (ITD 2007, Loeprick 2009). However, while 
strengthening enforcement of formal sector taxes may be appropriate for larger firms within 
the informal sector, for very small firms the administrative costs for the government are likely 
to be extremely high relative to potential revenue, while also imposing high compliance costs 
on small firms and presenting the risk of harassment and abuse. 
 
As a result, developing countries have overwhelmingly opted to establish relatively high 
thresholds for both VAT and income taxes so as to exclude most small and micro 
businesses, which are instead captured by presumptive tax regimes (discussed below). The 
one exception is the widespread use in some countries of withholding taxes. Withholding 
taxes are similar to taxing indirectly, but with the important difference that these taxes can be 
credited against the tax liability of tax-compliant firms. This means that it is only the non-
compliant firms that ultimately bear the taxes, thus providing an incentive for non-compliant 
firms to become tax compliant.  
 
These withholding taxes can be levied on imports or on domestic transactions, for example, 
where large tax-compliant firms collect withholding taxes on transactions that they make with 
small businesses that may not be tax compliant. For example, large construction companies 
may be required to withhold taxes on the payments that they make to small sub-contractors. 
The use of withholding tax on domestic transactions is widespread, including, for example, 
Sierra Leone (which requires tenants to withhold tax on rent payments to landlords), Burkino 
Faso (where all businesses have to withhold taxes on transactions with traders who are not 
tax-registered), and Bangladesh (which has very extensive withholding requirements).9 
 
Keen (2007) provides evidence that an appreciable number of countries similarly apply 
withholding taxes on imports that can be credited against income tax, including Benin, 
Burkino Faso, Central African Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sudan, Togo and Uganda. Of these, Burkino Faso, Mali, Niger and 
Togo apply higher withholding rates on importers without a tax identification number, thus 
bringing extra pressure to bear on those who are not tax compliant. Keen (2007) also 
provides a theoretical argument against the claim of Emran and Stiglitz (2005, see previous 
section), and shows that there is no place for tariffs if both VAT and withholding taxes are 
optimally set. Keen’s argument against tariffs is that a withholding tax on imports acts like a 
tariff on non-compliant firms (thus raising revenue from them) but is credited back to 
compliant firms. This means that there is no distortion of international trade for tax-compliant 
firms, and so the country is better able to take advantage of its comparative advantage. 
 
However, while withholding taxes have obvious merits, they can become administratively 
burdensome, introduce a high degree of incoherence to the overall system and discourage 
more fundamental reform (IMF 2011: 40). Administratively, effective withholding tax regimes 
require cooperation from withholding firms and, most importantly, an effective system for 
                                               
9   See presentation by Nasiruddin Ahmed and Aminur Rahman, National Board of Revenue, Bangladesh, at the ITD 
conference  ‘Effective Micro and Small Business Compliance Management –Tax Policy and Tax Administration 
Solutions’, 2-5 March 2010, City of Makati, Philippines.   
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crediting those firms from whom tax is withheld. Both Sierra Leone and Burkino Faso, for 
example, have difficulty in identifying and managing the large number of withholding 
agents.10 In contrast, Bangladesh has had considerable success with withholding taxes and 
collects more than half of its income tax revenue this way, though at the cost of significant 
administrative complexity.11  
3.3 Presumptive taxes 
 
At a very basic level, taxing small informal sector firms is hindered by two factors: high 
compliance costs for small taxpayers and high costs of collection for tax administrations 
(Loeprick 2009). In response, many countries apply presumptive taxes to small firms. These 
taxes use a simplified indicator of the tax base (profits and/or value added), in order to 
simplify record keeping for firms and the estimation of tax liabilities by tax collectors. 
 
While presumptive taxes share this basic commonality, their particular design is highly 
variable across countries. Loeprick (2009) outlines the available options for presumptive 
taxation, while Bird and Wallace (2003) provide a number of country examples, paying 
particular attention to transition countries. The options can be classified as: 
 
1. Allowing a simplification of the generally applicable tax base, such as the use of cash 
rather than accrual accounting. IMF (2011: 41) supports this approach, noting that ‘the 
difficulty is not that small traders cannot keep simple accounts – it is persuading them 
to share them’.  
 
2. Using some other financial measure as the tax base rather than net profit or net value-
added. Loeprick (2009) highlights turnover as a widely used measure, while Sadka and 
Tanzi (1993) argue for the use of a tax on gross assets. 
 
3. Using a non-financial indicator of tax liability, such as floor area or number of 
employees. This is the simplest approach, and allows the estimation of tax liabilities by 
tax collectors even in the absence of accounts, but also has the most obvious 
drawbacks. In the simplest form such taxes may approach a simple business fee, with 
microbusinesses periodically paying a lump sum tax at a fixed rate. 
 
Such presumptive tax regimes are extremely widespread, though they differ across countries 
in their specific features. In Ethiopia, instead of being subject to income tax and VAT, mid-
sized firms are required to pay a presumptive tax on income (based on turnover) as well as a 
2 per cent tax on turnover instead of VAT. Kenya levies a 3 per cent flat rate on turnover to 
replace both income tax and VAT. Tanzania operates a scheme in which tax is a 
progressively increasing proportion of turnover, and those without adequate records pay a 
larger amount. In Ghana the government operates a flat rate turnover tax of 3 per cent for 
small firms to replace standard VAT, while microbusinesses are covered by a tax stamp 
regime, in which a fixed tax is paid on a quarterly basis (Prichard 2009, 2010b). 
 
There is an important trade-off in the choice of these systems. The use of a tax base that is 
closer to the generally applicable tax base improves horizontal equity, and reduces any 
incentive for the firm to stay in the presumptive tax regime once they have developed the 
necessary skills to comply with the standard tax regime. As some measure of size is the 
normal criterion for inclusion in the presumptive regime, this can reduce firms’ incentives to 
grow. On the other hand, using a tax base that is much simpler to measure – such as 
                                               
10   See presentation by Sebastian James, FIAS, World Bank Group, at the ITD conference ‘Taxing Micro and Small 
Business - From Confrontation to Cooperation’, 22- 24 April 2009, Kigali, Rwanda. 
11   See presentation by Nasiruddin Ahmed and Aminur Rahman, National Board of Revenue, Bangladesh, at the ITD 
conference  ‘Effective Micro and Small Business Compliance Management –Tax Policy and Tax Administration 
Solutions’, 2-5 March 2010, City of Makati, Philippines.   
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number of workers – reduces the compliance burden on the firm and makes the liability 
easier to check for the tax administration.  
 
In addition, the use of a tax base that is further from the generally applicable tax base makes 
it more likely that at least some firms will pay substantially lower taxes in the presumptive 
regime than they would in the standard regime. Many presumptive regimes are deliberately 
designed to reduce the tax payments of smaller firms, increasing the problem of firms not 
wishing to graduate onto the standard regime when they are able to, and large firms making 
themselves appear small. This makes it necessary to have rules to prevent this from 
happening, for example a maximum level of turnover coupled with rules to prevent artificial 
splitting of businesses in order to get below the threshold.  
 
On the other hand, it is also possible, though seemingly less common, that some firms may 
bear a disproportionately heavy tax burden under poorly designed presumptive regimes. 
Most notably, turnover taxes, generally set at 2 or 3 per cent of turnover, make implicit 
assumptions about average rates of value added and profitability, but may consequently 
impose an unintentionally heavy burden on small firms with very narrow profit margins. This 
raises the question of whether presumptive regimes should be rebuttable (Bird and Wallace, 
2003, p. 21) – allowing such firms to opt for the standard regime. But for the smallest firms, 
opting into the standard regime is unlikely to be a plausible alternative. While attention to the 
risk of presumptive regimes that allow for reduced tax burden is crucial, it is also important to 
be aware of the risk of overtaxing small firms, particularly where profit margins are small and 
turnover-based taxes may overestimate profitability.  
4 Improving outcomes: incentives, politics 
and institutions 
 
While there is thus growing interest in taxing the informal economy, and well-established 
thinking about appropriate policy measures for taxing the informal sector, progress in 
practice has been comparatively slow. In part, this reflects the administrative complexity of 
locating and taxing very large numbers of small firms that are eager to evade being captured 
in the tax net. Though less researched, it also appears to reflect lack of commitment on the 
part of both political leaders and tax administrators, both of whom may face weak incentives 
to focus resources on taxing the informal economy. Collectively, this suggests the need to 
better understand incentives, politics and institutions in relation to informal sector taxation, in 
order to devise strategies for encouraging tax compliance among informal sector firms, 
strengthening political leadership and creating positive incentives for administrators. What 
follows first considers the question of tax payment from the perspective of firms, and then 
turns to an analysis of the interests of political leaders and administrators. 
4.1 Strengthening firm incentives, capacity and collective action 
 
Given their small size, mobility and potential political influence, more effective taxation of 
informal sector firms is likely to depend not only on more effective enforcement, but also on 
encouraging greater quasi-voluntary compliance among such firms. The incentives for 
informal sector firms to enter the tax net are closely connected to the broader question of 
formalisation, as firms are likely to enter the tax net in large part in order to access the 
potential economic benefits of formalisation (Perry et al 2007).12 It is consequently a small 
                                               
12  There is also a minority view in the literature that allowing informality is one way of governments dealing with the fact 
that they are unable to collect taxes, consequently unable to provide adequate public services such as the rule of law, or 
adequate employment opportunities in the formal sector (Garcia Bolivar 2006). 
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but growing literature on formalisation that offers the greatest insights into potential strategies 
for encouraging informal sector firms to enter the tax net. This literature can be usefully 
broken into three parts: (a) a cost-benefit approach, underpinned by a legalistic view which 
views informality as a choice; (b) an empowerment approach, underpinned by the dualist 
view that sees subsistence businesses forced into informality due to lack of capacity or 
access to services; and (c) an approach that emphasises the importance of collective action 
and state-society bargaining (Zinnes 2009, Kenyon 2007). 
4.1.1 Shifting incentives: a cost-benefit approach to tax compliance 
 
The dominant strand of existing research views formalisation as a rational choice for firms: 
firms will formalise if the benefits of formalisation outweigh the costs.13 Costs of formalisation 
include the time and resources taken in registration or getting licences, the cost of tax 
compliance, and the cost of following labour laws and other regulations. Benefits commonly 
take the form of access to credit and capital markets, government procurement contracts, 
other external markets, state-provided services and facilities. Benefits equally include 
avoiding the frequent costs of informality, including paying bribes and the need to provide 
free services, relocate or shut down business to avoid taxes (FIAS 2008). Significantly, much 
of the research in this area shows that tax evasion is generally not the primary reason for 
being informal (Friedman et. al. 2000); avoiding costly regulation is often a more powerful 
motivation (Ngoi 1997; De Soto 1989). Encouraging firms to enter the tax net may often 
depend on addressing these broader costs and benefits of formalisation. 
 
Several empirical surveys have contributed to understanding the cost-benefit calculations of 
firms, though these studies focus disproportionately on the costs of formality and informality. 
For example, a survey in Tanzania found that a poor Tanzanian entrepreneur would spend 
32,216 days waiting for approval for various permits, and pay over US$180,000 in income 
and fees, over the 50-year life of a business (ILD 2005 cited in Garcia-Bolivar 2006). Surveys 
in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Madagascar show that a significant proportion of informal firms 
have at some point attempted to become formal, but were deterred by the costs of doing so 
(Everest-Phillips 2008). A less conventional cost lies in the complexity of tax legislation, and 
Bonjean and Chambas (2004) argue that non-compliance often results from ignorance of tax 
legislation rather than deliberate evasion. Interestingly, cross-regional comparative evidence 
in Brazil shows that informal employment (and by extension informality) is lower in regions 
with better education, higher manufacturing and better governance, suggesting that the costs 
of formalisation may be higher where governance is weak (Jonasson 2011). 
 
The policy implication of such an approach is a focus on business environment reforms that 
reduce the costs of formalisation or increase the benefits. Reducing the costs of registration, 
which can be significant in many countries, has been the dominant approach (see Doing 
Business reports from the World Bank: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/>). Efforts have 
similarly been made to use tax compliance cost surveys, and tax evasion surveys, to help 
identify potential policy entry points that support formalisation and tax compliance (Coolidge 
2010, Gerxhani 2007). This has led, for example, to the creation of a new turnover tax for 
small businesses in South Africa; and to exempting microbusinesses from central taxes, and 
the creation of a simplified turnover tax regime for small businesses in Yemen (Coolidge 
2010, Everest-Phillips 2008). The assumption of these approaches is that if the costs of 
formalisation, including the costs of tax compliance, are reduced, businesses will formalise in 
order to gain the benefits of access to credit, security of property, government support for 
growth and access to markets. That said, some scholars have argued that the benefits likely 
need to be substantially higher than the costs in order to motivate firms to formalise (Zinnes 
2009).  
 
                                               
13  See Zinnes (2009) for a fuller exposition of the approach and critiques. 
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Several countries have undertaken such simplification and cost reducing reforms, but their 
impact on formalisation has been mixed. In Bolivia, while simplification of registration 
procedures did lead to an increased number of firm registrations, the size of the informal 
sector remained high (Garcia Bolivar 2006). In Vietnam, similar reforms led to an increase in 
registration, yet only 40 per cent of the newly registered firms had operated previously in the 
informal economy (Garcia Bolivar 2006). In Kenya, significant attention has similarly been 
given to the simplification of the tax system and business registration for small firms through 
the creation of a single business permit. Positively, and consistent with expectations, Devas 
and Kelly (2001) report that these efforts encouraged some degree of formalisation and 
improved conditions overall for small firms. On the other hand, it has become clear over time 
that the benefits are likely to remain partial, with firms particularly emphasising that 
formalisation does not necessarily imply freedom from harassment by local officials, and may 
in some cases lead to increased harassment.14 
 
An experiment in Lima, Peru shows the complexities of such formalisation policies (Jaramillo 
2010). Surveys showed that small businesses reported huge disadvantages to being 
informal, yet when licences were offered free (along with help in complying with regulations) 
only one in four firms were willing to take them. The author argues that the reasons are that 
there are recurrent costs of being formal (in addition to the one-time cost of registration), and 
these, along with low perceived benefits of formalisation, limited growth ambitions, and low 
trust in government, lead firms to avoid formalising even if it has no initial cost. A comparable 
experiment in Sri Lanka reported similar findings (de Mel et al. 2010). The lesson is that 
while reducing compliance costs is very important, it is not sufficient on its own to encourage 
widespread formalisation.15 
4.1.2 Empowering small firms  
 
While such cost-benefit analysis has been dominant in the literature, some scholars perceive 
informality primarily as a problem of empowerment, rather than as a choice (Abor and 
Quartey 2010, Kanbur 2011, Zinnes 2009). In this view, firms may be unable to register 
formally due to: problems of capacity – such as illiteracy, limited skills, transience of their 
business, uncertainty and the prevalence of cash transactions; and problems of the enabling 
environment – including a general lack of trust in government, and the lack of easy access to 
a range of services including information, accountancy, security, justice and insurance.16 
Thus, even if aware of the potential benefits of formalisation, such businesses would remain 
in the informal economy. Of course, lack of capacity and power can be seen as another facet 
of the costs of formalisation, but this approach stresses the involuntary nature of the informal 
economy, as opposed to the rational choice calculations of the cost-benefit approach.  
 
The policy advice that follows focuses on what the Commission on Legal Empowerment of 
the Poor (CLEP) (2008 quoted in Zinnes 2009) call the four pillars of legal empowerment:  
(i) strengthening access to justice; (ii) assuring property rights; (iii) ensuring safe working 
conditions, including for women and children; and (iv) increasing economic opportunities 
such as credit, markets and investment. However, no one policy mix is likely to fit all contexts 
(Kanbur 2011). This approach seems most appropriate to the subsistence end of the informal 
                                               
14  This draws on unpublished research conducted by Joshi, as well as Kamunyori (2007).  This emphasis on the 
importance  of bribes and harassment, alongside taxation and regulation, is likewise emphasised in survey evidence 
from Tanzania (Fjeldstad et al. 2006). 
15  Some cross-country analysis finds that the degree of state regulation seems to have a significant association with the 
size of the informal economy only in nations with effective law enforcement.  Where this is not the case, deregulatory 
policies are unlikely to achieve the goals of formalisation (Kus 2010).  
16  There is some interesting evidence to suggest that business associations can help overcome some of these 
empowerment barriers and can reduce transaction costs in disputes, help protect property rights and provide 
information about markets.  Thus membership of business associations can be a viable substitute for remaining 
informal.  Research finds that in transition countries they constitute a transparent, formal and efficient alternative to 
staying informal by helping reduce unofficial payments and bribes and underreporting for tax purposes (Nugent and 
Sukiassyan 2009). 
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economy spectrum in which illiteracy, lack of accounting skills, poor information and a 
mistrust of government prevails. An interesting approach to the issue of empowerment 
comes from China, where liberalisation of the economy has led to a considerable growth of 
the informal economy. In Shanghai the municipal authorities took a novel approach by 
creating informal labour associations, within which informal business and labour could 
organise. While technically these associations remained outside of the formal economy, they 
received government assistance in the form of training, preferential tax treatment and 
subsidised credit, to encourage growth and eventual formalisation (Howell, 2002).  
 
The implications of this approach for taxation purposes are twofold: a need to adapt tax 
regimes to the characteristics of informal firms (such as illiteracy, lack of trust and 
information); and a need to supplement business environment reform policies with other 
policies. Thus the policy canvass is broader than reducing costs of registration or increasing 
economic benefits, and includes important elements such as securing property rights (which 
are often the cause of transience), improving security (safety from theft or harassment), 
establishing dispute resolution mechanisms and affordable accountancy services. These can 
lead microbusinesses to view taxation as one step towards empowerment and legalisation, 
thus escaping arbitrary harassment and injustice. As De Soto (1989) pointed out many years 
ago, informal street vendors in Peru were keen to pay taxes to gain quasi-legal status, as 
insecure property rights can otherwise constrain investment and make expansion risky. 
4.1.3 Collective action and state-society interactions 
 
An extension of these two approaches seeks to focus additional attention on the nature of 
interactions between the state and informal sector operators, and on the importance of 
collective action within the informal economy (Tendler 2002, Kenyon 2007, Daly and Spence 
2010). Kenyon (2007) argues that, beyond simple cost-benefit analysis, formalisation policies 
need to acknowledge and address three key strategic problems: information, credibility and 
coordination.  
 
The importance of information is related to the need for empowerment, and arises from the 
fact that many intended beneficiaries in the informal economy simply are not aware of the 
programmes targeted at them. While this problem varies from one context to another, it is 
surprising how prevalent it is, and how large is the consequent need for states to adopt 
strategies that focus greater attention on outreach and taxpayer services.  
 
The importance of credibility reflects the fact that firms need assurances that the government 
will uphold their part of any bargain (of reduced tax rates, or provision of benefits) if firms 
formalise, as a fear of predation is a significant deterrent to successful formalisation policies 
(Jaramillo 2010). Given a pervasive lack of trust in government among many small firms, 
establishing this credibility can be challenging. In Bangladesh, the government encouraged 
the registration of businesses through tax fairs which reduced the costs involved, yet a major 
fear among firms was that while the registration process was relatively smooth, it might open 
the door to subsequent harassment.17 This issue of credibility is a recurrent theme in tax 
policy implementation, and has also been pointed out as a key element of success in the 
formation of autonomous revenue agencies (Talierco 2004).  
 
Finally, the importance of coordination lies in the fact that it is only in the interest of firms to 
formalise if they can be relatively certain that a critical mass of competitors will also do so. 
However, there are significant barriers to effective collective action in many sectors of the 
informal economy. This issue is taken up in Joshi and Ayee’s (2008) analysis of the 
conditions under which governments are likely to tax the informal economy successfully. 
Drawing on empirical evidence from Ghana, Peru and Senegal, they argue that the 
                                               
17  Unpublished research conducted by Prichard. 
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organisation of the informal economy matters, as the existence of collective actors who can 
bargain with policy makers around taxes is essential to arrive at policy solutions that both 
sides will buy into. In Senegal, although the informal sector was well organised with viable 
channels to bargain around taxes, informal sector associations were powerful and were able 
to resist the imposition of either VAT or direct taxes. In Peru, the government attempted to 
impose higher taxes on an informal sector that was fragmented and unorganised. This 
resulted in harassment of businesses in the absence of a real capacity to monitor and collect, 
and ultimately a dysfunctional system for all involved. In Ghana, the association of private 
transport operators was able to strike a deal with the government, and collected income 
taxes from its members in exchange for tangible services, in an arrangement which is 
detailed in section five. These findings thus point to the importance of collective actors and of 
credible institutional channels for negotiation between the state and associations, without 
which such bargaining cannot stick.  
 
As important as the need for collective actors within the informal sector, is the question of 
whether national revenue authorities are likely to have the capacity and interest to engage in 
negotiating with these collective actors. Particularly when the informal sector is loosely 
organised, often with several rival associations, negotiation implies understanding and 
interacting with several small collective actors with diverse interests. As is discussed in more 
detail below, relatively weak incentives for the tax administration to engage with taxing the 
informal sector may make negotiations unlikely. Bodin and Koukpaizan (2008) propose that 
local authorities are the more appropriate locus for such negotiations because they: (a) have 
incentives to invest in collecting taxes from this sector (due to their need for own source of 
revenue); (b) can provide tangible benefits to businesses thus increasing compliance; and (c) 
have more detailed knowledge about this sector than national tax agencies. Of course, such 
assignment requires capacity on the part of the local government to collect, and streamlining 
the graduation of growing firms into the national tax system. More generally, though, this 
discussion draws attention to the importance of collective action and state-society 
interactions to the success of efforts to tax the informal economy. 
4.2 Strengthening political and administrative commitment 
 
While the preceding discussion highlights growing attention to the factors that may shape 
incentives for firms to enter into the tax net and formalise, it is equally important to consider 
incentives for governments and the state to make taxing the informal sector a priority. 
Without reform champions who wield sufficient political influence to overcome entrenched 
resistance, successful reform is unlikely (e.g. Boesen 2004, Heredia and Schneider 2003). 
Unfortunately, there are a variety of reasons to believe that, in practice, government and 
state actors may face comparatively weak incentives to pursue more effective taxation of the 
informal economy aggressively. Progress will depend in part on strategies to build greater 
support for reform.  
 
This area has begun to receive some attention within the relevant literature (e.g. Tendler 
2002, Kenyon 2007, Daly and Spence 2010), but on balance has remained peripheral to 
most debates. What follows does not seek to delve into the little explored detail of why 
particular tax policies are adopted, but rather to consider the broader question of what 
incentives political and administrative leaders face with respect to informal sector taxation. 
That is, what can we say generally about the incentives that they face, and how might those 
incentives potentially shift? This section is divided into two parts. The first considers the 
incentives political leaders face, while the second considers the incentives facing 
administrators, from senior officials to frontline tax collectors.  
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4.2.1 Strengthening political incentives to pursue reform 
 
Though there are only a few studies of the issue, there are powerful reasons to expect that 
political leaders may have weak incentives to tax the informal economy. The simple version 
goes thus: informal taxpayers are too numerous and taxing them will raise very little revenue 
and make politicians unpopular, so it is not in the interest of politicians to tax them; better to 
leave them alone. For example, as Kloeden (2011: 26) points out, in Africa small and micro 
enterprises generate only up to 10 per cent of revenue, even though they comprise up to 90 
per cent of taxpayers. It would not be politically sensible for politicians to alienate a majority 
of their constituents by trying to impose taxes that raise little revenue. The fact that informal 
sector taxation may promote public engagement and broader governance gains, while 
attractive from the social perspective, is not likely to be a particularly strong inducement to 
governments. In most cases they would rather avoid such public mobilisation.18  
 
The more complex version of the argument suggests that it is actually in the interest of 
politicians to keep the informal economy informal, as a captive source of votes. In what 
Tendler (2002) calls a ‘devil’s deal’, politicians make an unspoken agreement with informal 
sector operators: ‘if you vote for me… I won’t collect taxes from you; I won’t make you 
comply with other tax, environmental or labour regulations; and I will keep the police and 
inspectors from harassing you’ (Tendler 2002: 99). This dynamic has long been observed in 
the literature on informal settlements and land markets, and, in fact, some argue is the 
reason why such settlements are provided services only incrementally (Baross 1990, Cross 
1998). Once formalised or provided with full benefits, politicians lose their hold over these 
groups who are then free to vote as they want. Once this deal is made, it is difficult to break 
as it serves the interests of all involved: firms like the universalist, burden reducing, support 
that it implies with respect to regulations and taxes; state officials like it as it does not disturb 
their rent seeking activities; and politicians are unwilling to take risks associated with other 
strategies of gaining electoral support.  
 
Despite this basic structure of incentives, instances of successful reform suggest that the 
challenge of changing these incentives is not insurmountable.19 However, none of the studies 
reviewed for this paper actually presented politicians’ perspectives, either through interviews, 
or through public statements. The interesting question for prospective reformers is under 
what circumstances may governments give greater priority to taxing the informal sector, and 
there is clearly much more research required in this area.  
Intuitively, the most obvious answer is that reform will be more politically feasible if it enjoys 
greater buy-in from informal sector firms themselves. As has been discussed at length, there 
is evidence suggesting that informal sector businesses are willing to pay taxes when: (a) the 
benefits outweigh the costs; (b) when they are sufficiently empowered; and (c) when there 
are effective institutional channels for facilitating collective action and bargaining (Roever 
2005). As such, adopting such strategies may not only be good for informal sector firms, but 
may shift the political balance for politicians seeking to build support for taxing the informal 
sector, and thus securing greater revenue, increased growth and, potentially, more 
productive state-society interactions.  
 
The earlier example of informal sector taxation in Ghana is indicative of the potential for such 
a mutually beneficial outcome. Negotiations between the government and informal sector 
                                               
18  There is anecdotal evidence of select governments claiming to be pursuing informal sector taxation specifically in order 
to spur public engagement among informal sector operators, by giving them a great stake in the state.  Whether or not 
such government statements are genuine, or mere public relations, is an important research question. Even if genuine, 
these seem more likely to be isolated examples than a replicable basis for reform across countries. 
19  As Haggard and Webb (1993: 144) have written of reform more broadly, reform experiences ‘show that interest group 
pressures need not block reform even in democracies. Under the right institutional conditions, astute political leaders 
can build new coalitions of winners that crowd out those with an interest in maintaining the status quo’. 
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associations produced modest revenue gains, improved conditions for informal sector actors 
and, most interestingly, strong alliances between political parties and associations of informal 
sector workers that helped realign political incentives. The result was an arrangement that, 
while imperfect, helped to generate a tax-paying culture that could contribute to state-building 
in the long run (Joshi and Ayee 2008, Prichard 2009). However, while this example is 
indicative of the potential for building political incentives for informal sector taxation, it also 
highlights the need to move beyond an existing policy discourse that is focused 
overwhelmingly on reducing costs of tax compliance, and the broader cost of formalisation. 
First, it suggests that while cost-reducing measures are very important, there is a need for 
equal attention to be paid to establishing clear benefits to formalisation (Jaramillo 2010), not 
least of which is providing credible assurances of protection from harassment from public 
officials (Kamunyori 2007). Second, it draws attention to the essential role of informal sector 
collective action, and the existence of institutional channels for bargaining with government, 
in facilitating the emergence of such agreements. There is thus a seemingly strong argument 
for seeking to support both elements. 
 
Of course, while getting buy-in from the informal sector is likely to be integral to generating 
political support for reform, it is also possible that broader constituencies for taxing the 
informal sector may emerge, or may be fostered by reform leaders. Broadly, reform leaders 
may seek to frame the drive to tax the informal economy in terms of the need to foster growth 
and the opportunity to foster a stronger fiscal social contract. However, framing of the debate 
is likely to be of limited value on its own. More pointedly, the one constituency with potentially 
strong incentives to support the taxation of the informal economy is formal sector firms. Of 
course, some such firms clearly benefit from informality, and may intentionally work with 
informal sector partners in order to avoid government regulation. However, informal sector 
firms are also frequently direct competitors for formal sector firms, while the formalisation of 
informal firms may facilitate transactions with the formal sector. Consistent with this logic, in 
Kenya formal sector businesses became a key interest group supporting government efforts 
to expand taxation and formalisation, going so far as to support the strengthening of informal 
sector associations directly in order to facilitate bargaining (Prichard 2010b). This suggests 
the possibility that trying to facilitate a broader dialogue between government, formal sector 
associations and informal sector associations may hold promise, though the potential for 
disagreement is obvious.  
4.2.2 Strengthening administrative incentives to pursue reform 
 
Irrespective of policy choices, the success of any tax will depend on the effectiveness of 
administration. This is reflected in the oft-quoted maxim that ‘tax administration is tax policy’ 
(Casanegra de Jantscher 1990), and in the observation, more than two decades ago, that tax 
policy reform is sometimes surprisingly easily achieved precisely because opponents realise 
that weak administration means it will rarely be well implemented (Ascher 1989). This is all 
the more true of informal sector taxation, which relies heavily on regular interactions between 
tax collectors and taxpayers, and involves enormous scope for non-enforcement and/or 
corruption by so-called street level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980). While powerful political 
leadership in the push for reform can certainly encourage more committed administrative 
effort, tax administrations can also be powerful actors in their own right. A resistant 
administration may be able to block reform, either through political influence or simply weak 
implementation, while a proactive administration may be able to advance meaningful reform. 
 
As with political elites, there is evidence that tax administrators may generally have weak 
incentives to prioritise taxation of the informal economy, for at least two reasons. First, the 
likely revenue gains are relatively modest. For a tax administrator under pressure to meet 
revenue targets, it is much easier to focus attention on large taxpayers than to invest in 
painstaking collection from a large number of small taxpayers. Second, for individual tax 
administrators collecting taxes and enforcing compliance among small operators tends to 
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represent a particularly demanding task. It is poorly rewarded, offers few opportunities for 
informal payments and appears to be widely viewed as, at best, lacking prestige, or, at worst, 
degrading. While there is a need for more research on the perceptions of administrators, the 
implication of this is that there may be strong resistance to focusing on informal sector 
taxation from among the rank and file within tax administrations.  
 
At a broad level, the obvious policy implication of these issues is that any reform strategy 
must pay attention not only to broad political incentives, but also to incentives for 
administrators to buy into reform. This could take a huge range of forms, and research has 
the potential to yield important new insights into such strategies.  
 
One relatively straightforward possibility is the simple reorganisation of rewards and 
incentives for tax administrators, so that involvement with taxing the informal sector is better 
rewarded and more conducive to future advancement. This may, among other things, rely on 
the development of performance benchmarks that are more diverse and nuanced than 
current heavy reliance on the simple meeting of revenue collection targets (Bird and 
Vazquez-Caro 2011).20 A more ambitious approach to the same challenge may lie in 
institutional reform to reward informal sector taxation better. Recent attention to the potential 
advantages of the segmental organisation of tax administration, with specialised units for 
small, medium and large taxpayers, is potentially consistent with this goal (IMF 2011: 20).  
 
Another possible option is greater use of technology to facilitate informal sector taxation, with 
a particularly interesting possibility being the use of mobile banking to make tax payments 
(Loeprick 2009). Such an approach has the immediate benefit of reducing interaction 
between tax officials and taxpayers, and the consequent risks of harassment, collusion and 
corruption. However, it may also have several broader benefits. It may increase taxpayer 
support for reform, as it could help to make the banking system accessible to very small firms 
while reducing fears among firms that registration will result in expanded harassment. It may 
similarly increase support among tax administrators, by not only reducing the costs of 
collection for tax administration, but perhaps also making the work of collection less 
unattractive and painstaking for front line tax collectors. 
 
A more radical option, noted earlier, is to decentralise elements of informal sector taxation to 
sub-national governments. This possibility is discussed in more detail below, but the 
overarching message here is that taxation of informal sector firms is likely to be of much 
greater fiscal importance to local governments. This may give political leaders and tax 
administrators alike stronger incentives to make it a priority. This possibility remains 
speculative, but reflects the type of reform strategies that may expand the political feasibility 
of taxing the informal economy. 
  
                                               
20  Though beyond the scope of this paper, there are good reasons to believe that over-reliance on revenue targets, by 
governments and donors alike, remains an important part of the problem, both in relation to informal sector taxation, and 
more broadly. In isolation, revenue targets, which can be an important part of broader benchmarking efforts, have the 
potential to prioritise short-term and often coercive collection at the expense of investments in building rules-based, 
transparent and client-oriented administration (Bird and  Vazquez-Caro 2011, Prichard et al. (forthcoming), Fjeldstad 
2001). 
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5 Making informal sector taxation work: 
lessons from recent experience 
 
Improving taxation of the informal economy will demand not only technically appropriate 
policy choices, about which much is known, but also broader administrative and institutional 
reform strategies that can generate both greater acceptance among taxpayers and 
leadership among political and administrative actors. The discussion so far has highlighted 
potential elements of such strategies in abstract. This final section examines some recent 
administrative reform efforts in light of the broad messages explored so far. These reform 
efforts have generally been poorly studied, and as such the discussion here is very 
preliminary. It seeks to highlight potential alternative trajectories of reform, and the extent to 
which these different strategies seem to address major barriers to more effective taxation. 
This discussion thus aims to buttress the analysis presented so far, but also to point towards 
possible future directions for both policy and research. 
 
5.1 Reorganising tax administration: segmental organisation and the Block 
Management System (BMS), Tanzania21 
 
The most straightforward administrative strategy for improving informal sector taxation is 
simply to reorganise tax administration, so as to strengthen monitoring and provide more 
focused incentives for administrators to target small firms. At a broad level, a recent push 
among many tax reform experts for the introduction of segmental organisation of tax 
administration, with separate departments to deal with small, medium and large firms, 
respectively, is consistent with this goal. Such reform is intended to allow for services more 
specifically tailored to the needs and realities of small firms, and to ensure that tax 
administrators will have incentives to focus on these firms despite potentially low revenue 
yields (IMF 2011: 20).  
 
The logic of such segmental organisation can, in principle, be extended further, in creating 
ever more specialised units for taxing informal sector firms. For example, as part of a broader 
set of reforms targeted at micro and small firms since 2002, Tanzania has introduced a Block 
Management System (BMS) aimed at promoting compliance and registering all eligible 
traders within particular sectoral or geographic areas. The BMS is set up so that trading 
areas are mapped and divided into blocks on the basis of geography, administrative 
boundaries or a few streets. Each block is mandated to operate all tax functions of 
identification, registration, assessing and accounting for revenue collected, with the BMS 
team allocated a team of staff with relevant skills to perform these functions. The BMS team 
locate themselves in identified blocks by rotation and intensify their efforts to identify, 
register, educate and interact with taxpayers, particularly in the informal economy. Door-to-
door visits are made to ensure all eligible taxpayers are registered. Each block is set a target 
for revenue collection, with presumptive taxes used for assessment purposes.  
 
Existing evidence suggests that the BMS has resulted in increasing the number of 
businesses registering with the tax administration. In 2006-2007, 16 per cent of new 
registrants were through the BMS. In 2007-2008, the number had grown to 43 per cent, and 
this was sustained in 2008-2009 at 41 per cent. While the system has thus shown some 
apparent success, research has yet to explore taxpayer perceptions of this system or the 
political economy factors that have underpinned this innovative effort, and there is significant 
scope for future research. That said, it is interesting to note that at least part of the push for 
                                               
21  This section draws heavily on a presentation by Christine Shekidele, Deputy Commissioner TRA made at the ITD 
conference on ‘Taxing Small and Micro-Business: From Confrontation to Cooperation’, 22-24 April 2009, Kigali, 
Rwanda. 
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this system came from formal firms, who were upset about paying taxes while facing 
competition from informal businesses. Broadening the tax base was thus a strategic 
objective for the tax administration to improve compliance among all taxpayers.  
 
5.2 Associational taxation: Identifiable Grouping Taxation (IGT), Ghana 
 
While one approach is to focus primarily on enforcement, an alternative approach is to seek 
actively to address the importance of collective action and credibility for the success of efforts 
to tax the informal sector. Such a strategy implies proactive efforts to foster effective 
collective action within the informal sector, coupled with the creation of institutional channels 
to facilitate bargaining and cooperation between informal sector associations and the state. 
 
This has been the focus of research undertaken by Joshi and Ayee (2008), who focus 
particularly on the development of associational taxation in Ghana. From 1987 to 2003 the 
Ghanaian Internal Revenue Service delegated responsibility for collecting income tax from 
the informal sector to the associations of the informal sector – a strategy called Identifiable 
Grouping Taxation (IGT). The arrangement originated in the politics of the corporatist 
relationship between the largest passenger transport union, the Ghana Private Road 
Transport Union, and the Rawlings regime (1981-2000), and continued after the electoral 
victory of the opposition (Joshi and Ayee 2002, Joshi and Ayee 2008). Following success in 
the early years, the arrangement was extended to associations in thirty-two other informal 
sector activities. IGT has been credited with increasing revenues generated from the informal 
sector (Joshi and Ayee 2008). 
 
The arrangement overcomes some of the problems associated with tax collection from 
microbusinesses. From the perspective of the tax administration, IGT reduced collection 
costs to a fixed 2.5 per cent, which was paid to the associations for their work in collection. 
The associations bore the burden of identifying members and ensuring that they complied. 
From the perspective of the associations, becoming tax compliant granted them legitimacy, 
and helped to protect them from more arbitrary harassment by public officials and police. The 
system allowed for micropayments (initially the system collected taxes daily from transport 
workers, then shifted to weekly payments). This suited the uncertainty of earnings in the 
sector and did not become a visible burden. In addition, complying with the tax payments did 
not make operators individually visible to the state, thus protecting them from the imposition 
of other, perhaps more burdensome, regulations. The downside was that often informal 
associations were not internally democratic, and extracted revenues from members without 
necessarily handing over the collections to the revenue authority. Another problem was that 
the associations and linked taxation were seen as tax havens for larger enterprises, which 
could avoid paying full liabilities by claiming to be within the IGT and its presumptive taxes.  
 
These drawbacks became increasingly apparent over time. Despite this, one of the big 
achievements of the system was inculcating a culture of taxpaying within businesses in the 
informal economy. This proved important when, recognising growing problems with the IGT 
system, the government decided to shift to a more common presumptive tax regime, known 
as the Tax Stamp and Vehicle Income Tax. These new regimes called for informal sector 
and private transport operators to purchase tax compliance stickers from the tax authorities 
on a quarterly basis. These were to be visibly displayed at all times. This provided a relatively 
simple method of tax compliance, but, perhaps most notably, was introduced without any 
significant resistance. Small tax payments had become a regular expectation for these firms, 
many of which actually welcomed a shift from the once popular, but increasingly problematic, 
IGT system (Prichard 2009, 2010b).22 
 
                                               
22  Observers have noted the potential for such arrangements to work in other countries.  For example, see McKerchar and 
Evans (2009) for Nigeria. 
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The Ghanaian experiment with IGT and the later move to standard presumptive taxes is 
useful in highlighting several issues. First, that the outlook for taxing the informal sector is not 
as bleak at it appears, and governments fearing a backlash from attempting taxation may 
find that the informal sector is not as averse to taxation as one might be led to believe. 
Second, a close examination of the political context in specific countries might offer clues to 
potential entry points for taxation that work with the grain of existing state-society relations. 
Finally, while the IGT is not an ideal tax given some of the drawbacks discussed earlier, if 
one looks at taxation from a broader, long-term perspective, it does offer a possible route to 
taxation of the informal economy, with a view towards building more accountable and 
inclusive states.  
5.3 Emphasising transparency, services and engagement 
 
Complementing strategies that focus on enforcement and quite explicit negotiation and 
cooperation, are more general efforts to focus attention on fostering voluntary compliance by 
emphasising transparency, taxpayer services and engagement. Such a strategy grows out of 
the need to foster quasi-voluntary compliance among small firms if informal sector taxation is 
to be either technically or politically feasible. While there is, again, little systematic research 
on this topic, select cases suggest ways to move forward.  
 
A first possibility is to focus on transparency, and particularly on establishing clearer links 
between tax payments and the provision of public services. Such approaches may exist on a 
spectrum running from transparency about overall revenue collection and public expenditure, 
to more explicit forms of tax earmarking, where specific taxes are allocated to particular 
purposes. More explicit earmarking has the advantage of potentially building stronger trust 
among taxpayers by delivering well defined benefits, but has the disadvantage of reducing 
budget flexibility and creating a perverse expectation that taxes should function on a fee-for-
service basis, rather than on the basis of a broader conception of the public good. A recent 
example comes from Sierra Leone, where local governments have been attempting to 
expand local government tax capacity, including through taxes on markets and small 
businesses. Research by Jibao and Prichard (2012) finds that the most successful efforts 
have been in Bo City Council, where the government has gone to great lengths to 
communicate revenue and expenditure data to the public, including informally highlighting 
connections between specific taxes and public expenditure. In a similar vein, Korsun and 
Meagher (2004) report findings from a donor-funded project in Guinea, where the collection 
of market taxes doubled after they were linked explicitly to the construction of new market 
facilities. While such explicit forms of earmarking cannot be applied universally, they indicate 
the potential to encourage compliance through transparency. 
 
A slightly different strategy for encouraging tax compliance lies in strengthening taxpayer 
services. Such an approach appears to be in its infancy in Gambia, where the creation of a 
semi-autonomous revenue authority in 2004 enabled the Gambian tax administration to 
begin a systematic approach to informal sector taxation.23 Besides the introduction of 
standard reforms such as the Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN), this has involved a 
variety of measures apparently aimed at improving the customer interface: decentralised tax 
offices with modern facilities throughout the country; tax tribunals that offer taxpayers a cost-
effective way of seeking redress; tax clinics to help with filing of taxes; a taxpayer education 
programme that allows direct exchanges between the Gambian Revenue Authority (GRA) 
and taxpayers; and the publication of Revnews, a magazine to disseminate information about 
taxation to the general population. Although the impact of these measures is not yet known, 
the GRA appears to be starting from the perspective of taxation as a reciprocal relationship 
in which services are rendered to consumers who have rights. Research into how this 
                                               
23  Based on the presentation of Bakary K. Sanyang, Commissioner for Domestic Taxes, Gambia at the ITD conference on 
‘Taxing Small and Micro-Business: From Confrontation to Cooperation’, 22-24 April 2009, Kigali, Rwanda. 
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approach is perceived by tax officials, as well as informal sector operators, will be important 
in assessing its impact on revenue-raising as well as strengthening accountability. 
 
A final strategy is for revenue authorities to seek proactively to foster the development of 
informal sector associations, and more proactive negotiation and dialogue between the state 
and informal sector operators. This recognises the centrality of collective action and 
bargaining to successful outcomes. This has been part of the strategy adopted by the 
Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA), which has sought to cooperate with the Private Sector 
Federation (PSF), an umbrella organisation for all kinds of business, and local government.24 
The RRA, in dialogue with the PSF, established the Tax Issues Forum (TIF) as a platform 
where issues related to tax policy, compliance and tax rates could be discussed among 
stakeholders. Under the TIF, PSF conducts a business census that is then used by RRA to 
identify unregistered taxpayers. Technical committee meetings are held to help RRA better 
understand industry issues, including profitability, constraints to growth and service needs. 
The PSF uses the forum to understand taxpayer rights and obligations and filter them to its 
members. While such approaches are still at an early stage, further research into the 
creation of durable and inclusive institutions such as the TIF, that simultaneously deal with 
problems of information, collective action and credibility which pose barriers to formalisation 
(and subsequent taxation) of informal sector enterprises, can offer greater insights into the 
politics of business state interactions around taxation.  
5.4 Ceding control to local government: experience in Cameroon25 and 
Ethiopia 
 
A more radical option for the re-organisation of tax administration in relation to informal 
sector firms is to decentralise responsibility for this to sub-national government. Local 
governments already levy significant taxes (see Corthay 2009, Loeprick 2009), and 
extending their responsibility may encourage voluntary compliance and strengthen political 
and administrative commitment to taxing small firms.  
 
Boudin and Koukpaizan (2008) argue four possible benefits to such a strategy: (a) local 
governments have greater need of resources, and may thus have stronger incentives to 
pursue taxation of informal firms; (b) taxes are expected to be closer to, and thus responsive 
to, local conditions; (c) local governments may be better placed to negotiate productively with 
informal sector actors, and respond by supplying relevant services to informal sector 
operators; and (d) it may encourage greater coherence, as there is, at present, frequently 
large and harmful overlap between taxes levied by different levels of government. On the 
other hand, there are important risks: local governments may lack necessary capacity; there 
is a risk of wasteful tax competition between localities; local government may in some cases 
be particularly arbitrary and coercive (Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008, Moore 2008); and 
disconnecting local taxation from the national level may, in fact, lead to more double taxation 
and complicate the transition of firms into the formal tax system.  
 
In Cameroon, there has been recent discussion of ceding responsibility for collection of taxes 
from microbusinesses to local government. The national revenue authority has neither the 
capacity nor interest to engage substantially with this sector, which is relatively unorganised 
and offers limited revenue potential. Several local mayors are, in fact, asking for such 
responsibilities. Unlike national tax authorities, local governments need the revenue sources 
for the provision of services and have the possibility of using such revenue to improve 
services for the informal firms, thus increasing the likelihood of compliance. Moreover, local 
                                               
24  Based on presentations made by Uzarama Vincent, Deputy Commissioner Rwanda Revenue Authority, and Emmanuel 
Hategeka, CEO Private Sector Federation, at  the ITD conference on ‘Taxing Small and Micro-Business: From 
Confrontation to Cooperation’, 22-24 April 2009, Kigali, Rwanda.  
25  Personal interview, Gerard Chambas, 25 May 2011, as well as information presented by the Cameroonian tax 
authorities at the Ministerial Meeting of the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, 17-19 April, Washington DC. 
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authorities have better information about the scale, location and profitability of informal firms, 
and greater capacity to monitor and enforce tax payments.26  
 
Resistance to adopting this policy has focused particularly on the risk that local government 
lacks the capacity to collect these taxes effectively and fairly. Consideration has been given 
to the possibility of support from the local office of the budget administration (an offshoot of 
the treasury that helps control accounts). There is currently little coordination between tax 
administration and budget administration at the local level, and, from some accounts, the 
budget administration office would be well placed and willing to help establish informal 
microenterprise taxation in local government. What this would require, however, is the 
coordination of tax policy  between local and national governments in order to avoid both tax 
evasion and double taxation, as well as to encourage firms to graduate out of the informal 
taxation regime as they grow (Loeprick 2009). 
 
Experience in Ethiopia has followed a somewhat similar path, and offers some tentative 
support to the viability of decentralised taxation of small firms. Ethiopia is a federal state, and 
regional governments control small business taxation. Under Ethiopian law, from 2008 firms 
are divided into three categories based on turnover, with firms with turnover above $50,000 
subject to the standard tax regime. The two smallest categories of firms are not expected to 
maintain detailed financial accounts. Instead of being subject to income tax and VAT, these 
firms are required to pay a presumptive tax on income27 and a 2 per cent tax on turnover 
(Prichard 2010b).  
 
While bearing in mind that capacity constraints are likely to be less severe at the regional 
level than at the local government level, the Ethiopian experience nonetheless points to 
some of the perceived benefits of sub-national collection. Most obviously, while tax revenue 
from these firms represents only a relatively small share of national tax revenue, it is a very 
important component of revenue for regional governments. It has thus given greater effective 
meaning to decentralisation efforts. Though central control remains substantial, the 
importance of this revenue means that effective administration has been given greater 
attention. Equally interesting, the proximity of the regional tax authorities to the affected firms 
appears to have contributed to greater discussion around the design of the tax. Following 
unhappiness with the tax, authorities brought representatives from business associations and 
businesses at large on to the committees responsible for estimating the turnover of small 
firms, thus increasing the perceived legitimacy and fairness of the system. Finally, there is 
some evidence that taxation of small businesses has contributed to encouraging public 
engagement by firms, with small business taxation emerging as an important issue in the 
wake of 2005 elections (Prichard 2010b). 
 
5.5 Auctioning tax collection rights 
 
Finally, perhaps the oldest strategy for strengthening taxation of informal sector firms is 
privatisation of the tax administration, with individual firms bidding for tax collection rights, 
and then retaining any additional taxes collected. In principle, privatisation provides clear 
incentives for the maximisation of enforcement and collection, but in practice it has been 
prone to corruption, while doing little to encourage negotiation, voluntary compliance or more 
productive interactions between state and society. It is thus a relatively narrow strategy, 
though it may prove useful in specific circumstances.  
 
                                               
26  In a similar vein, Pashev (2006), examining presumptive taxes in Bulgaria, argues that such taxes should not be loaded 
with equity objectives but assigned to enhance collection efficiency. He suggests their best use is as licence taxes on 
microbusinesses levied by local governments, rather than as central taxes on income. 
27  Tax liability is assessed by estimating turnover, applying a predetermined industry-specific profit rate and then taxing the 
resultant profits at the standard income tax rate (Prichard 2010b, Warner 2005a, 2005b). 
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History is full of examples of tax farming, in which the rights to collect taxes have been 
auctioned to the highest bidder. Stella (1992) reviews the history of tax farming since its 
introduction in Mesopotamia in about 1750 BC. He shows that, historically, while the system 
delivered revenue, it usually resulted in overzealous tax collection – as a result of the 
excessive incentive for the tax collector – leading to resentment and even rioting amongst 
the population. This is not what is wanted in the context of improving government 
accountability and good governance. 
  
In more contemporary settings, experience with the privatisation of informal sector taxation is 
very poorly documented, though not uncommon, particularly at the local (sub-national) 
government level. The most extensive studies are those of Iversen et al. (2006) in Uganda 
and Fjeldstad et al. (2009) in Tanzania, both of which document relatively prominent 
examples of privatised tax collection at the local government level. Both studies conclude 
that in some cases privatisation has led to greater and more predictable revenue collection. 
However, they also highlight significant problems. While the historical literature focuses on 
the risk of overzealous and arbitrary tax collection, these studies suggest that the largest 
problems have occurred at the contracting stage, as the price paid for tax collection rights by 
private collectors is often far below actual revenue potential, leading to limited government 
revenue and high profits for tax collectors. While this might, in principle, reflect problems of 
asymmetric information, Iversen et al. (2006) in particular argue that such information 
problems are quite limited, and that contracting problems generally reflect politicisation and 
corruption. The overarching conclusion is that privatisation can yield some revenue gains 
when well managed, but in practice corruption has often outweighed these potential gains. 
 
Similarly, in India some urban authorities have for some time been auctioning off the rights to 
collect local taxes from street vendors in local markets.28 In the city of Patna, street vendors 
are liable to pay local taxes in order to operate, and city authorities have auctioned off rights 
to collection for a number of years. Although there is significant revenue generated for the 
municipal authorities, there are two problems. First, auctions of the licences to collect taxes 
are not free and fair. Collusion among contractors (to reduce the highest bid amount), and 
between municipal officials and contractors (in the awarding of the contracts), has led to 
reduced revenue generation compared to potential. Second, contractors who won licences to 
collect exploit their position and often over-tax street vendors, who are often illiterate and not 
aware of the rates or their rights. 
  
                                               
28  Interviews by Joshi with staff of Streetnet International, Patna, India, July 2004.  
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6 Conclusion: key remaining questions  
 
The starting point for any discussion of informal sector taxation remains a question of 
assessing whether this should, in fact, be a public policy priority. This paper has suggested 
that it should be given greater priority than has historically been the case. This reflects a 
judgment about the potential benefits of such taxation as against the costs, but this is an 
area that continues to warrant additional research not only into the magnitude of these costs 
and benefits, but into their distribution across population groups. In some parts of the world 
particular population groups – e.g. women, ethnic minorities, or religious groupings – are 
overrepresented in the informal sector generally, or in particular occupations. However, we 
continue to know remarkably little about whether and how particular groups, like women (e.g. 
Caroll 2011), may be disproportionately impacted by policy in this area. In broad terms, 
informal sector taxation has somewhat limited potential to produce immediate revenue gains, 
is subject to high administrative costs, and, because it primarily targets already low-income 
individuals, risks having significant negative social and economic costs. Given these 
limitations, the case in favour of expanding informal sector taxation depends largely on three 
more indirect claims.  
 
First, there is some evidence that taxing informal sector operators is important to build tax 
morale and a culture of compliance, both among small firms and within the economy more 
broadly, though there is need for more detailed evidence to support this highly intuitive claim. 
Second, there is growing evidence that taxing the informal sector can be important for 
economic growth, by encouraging the growth of small firms, and creating a better overall 
business environment for formal sector firms. However, there remains scope for more 
research to understand how large these effects are, which firms are most likely to benefit 
and, perhaps most interestingly, what specific policies for encouraging formalisation may be 
most important to promote longer term gains in growth. The growth gains associated with 
formalisation are contingent on the claim that formal firms are able to access important 
benefits, from credit to improved security, but it is not yet clear which of these benefits are 
most important for micro and small firms. Finally, significant recent discussion has focused 
on the potential for informal sector taxation to prompt state-society bargaining and broader 
governance gains, but evidence remains relatively limited. There is significant scope for 
research looking at the potential for informal sector taxation to spur collective action and 
bargaining. There is equally a need for research into the potential for informal sector taxation 
to spur broader investments in building related state capacity, be it in the realm of policing, 
providing basic services or developing institutions to settle disputes. 
 
Moving from the question of whether the informal sector should be taxed to the question of 
how to do so, a great deal is known and widely accepted about the various policy options for 
effective informal sector taxation. This covers not only the distinction between taxing 
indirectly, directly or through specialised presumptive regimes, but also the variations of 
presumptive taxation, and their costs and benefits. There has similarly been more attention 
to the costs and benefits to firms of tax compliance and broader formalisation. Increasing 
numbers of surveys have shed light on the costs of tax compliance and formalisation for 
small firms, and yielded policy strategies to minimise these costs and thus seek to encourage 
firms to enter the formal system.  
 
This paper has sought to review some of what is known about these questions, and, more 
importantly, to draw attention to a set of issues about which less in known, and about which 
there is scope for significant research and policy experimentation. These issues broadly 
relate to the question of how to translate growing interest in taxing the informal economy into 
better outcomes in practice. Conceptually, we have suggested that at a broad level we can 
focus, in turn, on the interconnected challenges of expanding quasi-voluntary tax compliance 
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and of building government and state commitment to reform. However, in both areas 
significant questions remain. 
 
With respect to encouraging compliance among informal sector firms, recent work has shed 
significant light on reducing costs of compliance and formalisation, but has said much less 
about how to provide positive incentives to formalisation. This is particularly important given 
recent evidence that lower costs can help, but are not, in themselves, enough to transform 
outcomes. There appears to be a need for attention to two big questions. First, what type of 
positive inducements to tax compliance – such as access to credit and training, greater 
security of property or protection from harassment by police and local officials – are most 
important to micro and small firms? Second, how can states and governments more 
effectively promote collective action among informal sector operators, and provide 
institutional channels for bargaining with them, in order to build trust and encourage tax 
compliance and formalisation? Together, these questions represent important directions for 
extending existing research and policy practice. 
 
Less is currently known about generating support from political leaders and tax 
administrators for more effective taxation of the informal economy, and specific questions are 
less clearly defined. At a broad level, there is a need to study episodes of successful reform 
and innovation, in order to better understand the conditions under which governments and 
administrators have embraced and implemented reform. At a more specific level, this paper 
has suggested several possibilities that warrant further exploration. The first is that the 
adoption of policies aimed at increasing the benefits of voluntary tax compliance may, by 
addressing the needs of informal sector operators, make reform more politically feasible and 
attractive. A second is that efforts to foster effective collective action among informal sector 
associations, and open up institutional channels of negotiation, may help expand the tax 
base. The inclusion of formal sector businesses in some such processes may further build a 
constituency for reform.  
 
The final section of this paper explored the possibility that administrative and institutional 
reform related to the collection of informal sector taxes may be able not only to address 
narrow administrative shortcomings, but also generate positive incentives among taxpayers, 
political leaders and administrators alike. The experience of associational taxation presents 
one potentially compelling route to develop more institutionalised links between the state and 
informal sector associations, and thus lead to more effective taxation and, potentially, 
broader governance gains. Similarly, the prospect of decentralising a greater part of the 
taxation of micro and small firms to local government holds significant risks, but also 
promises both to strengthen commitment to reform and encourage engagement between 
taxpayers and governments. However, these and other possibilities remain insufficiently 
studied, and thus largely remain exciting but as yet uncertain possibilities.  
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